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experience, immigrants rely on information about the political landscape of the origin and host
countries to form expectations about the context of reception in the host society. We use
data on bilateral migration and government ideology for 36 OECD countries between 1990 and
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1 Introduction
Which countries do migrants move to? Migration patterns have long been a fertile area of research
in social science, but the determinants of migration flows have become of particular interest today
due to a rapid increase in transnational population movements. By one estimate, the number
of international migrants reached 272 million in 2019, a 23% increase since 2010.1 And about
54% of worldwide migrants reside in the OECD countries.2 In recent years, the availability of
comprehensive data on bilateral migration flows has made it possible to shed light on the general
patterns of migration flows and to explore systematically the determinants of migration (see e.g.,
Lewer and Van den Berg, 2008; Mayda, 2010; Caragliu et al., 2013; Bertoli and Moraga, 2013; Beine
and Parsons, 2015; Beine et al., 2019).
Numerous factors push potential migrants from their home countries and pull them towards
their host countries, in particular differences in income or in the supply of public goods and promise
of human capital accumulation (Beine et al., 2011; Verdugo, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2018); environ-
mental shocks including epidemics and natural disasters (Beine and Parsons, 2015); migration costs
such as geographic and linguistic distances (Adsera and Pytlikova, 2015); population control and
immigration policies (Czaika and Parsons, 2017; Helbling and Leblang, 2019); and the presence of
migration networks and other uncertainty-reducing infrastructures (Clark et al., 2007; Beine et al.,
2019). While the extant empirical research on migration has incorporated a wide range of economic
considerations, political and ideological factors have been largely absent from the debate on where
immigrants decide to settle. A notable exception is the recent work of Bracco et al. (2018), who
demonstrate that the election of a mayor from the anti-immigration party Lega Nord in Italy led to
a reduction in the inflows of immigrants to the same municipality. We contribute to this debate by
showing how considerations about the political landscape of the host society vis-a-vis the political
context in the home country affects the choice of migration destination across borders.3
Recent studies have recognized the role of psychological and emotional factors and expectations,
in particular the “context or reception”, in affecting migrants’ destination choice (Menjivar, 1997;
Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; White and Johnson, 2016). We build on these studies and argue that,
in absence of first-hand experience about the context of reception in the country of destination,
individuals rely on heuristic or information shortcuts in processing information and making decisions
(Lupia, 1994; Just, 2019). Before moving to a new country, immigrants lack a direct exposure to
its social and political landscape, and they are thus particularly dependent on these heuristics. To
form heuristics about the context of reception, immigrants rely on information about the origin and
1See UN data available here: bit.ly/Migration2019
2https://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/Migration-data-brief-4-EN.pdf
3In a similar vein, Helbling and Leblang (2019) find that migrants are less likely to go to countries where citizens
have expressed support for radical right-wing political parties. We do not limit our study to far-right parties, whose
rise is arguably a relatively recent phenomenon. In addition, we argue that information about the government in the
country of origin also plays an important role.
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host country’s political system and government ideology (Just, 2019). Traditionally, government
ideology influence policy-making and left-wing and right-wing politicians provide policies consistent
with the preferences of their partisans (Potrafke, 2017); whereas left parties are known to support
progressive stance on immigrant integration, conservative parties are more likely to form alliances
with radical right parties and oppose anti-discrimination policies, the naturalization of immigrants,
and other integration policies (Money, 1999; Givens, 2007). As political parties take positions
on immigration, the political ideology of the destination government and its distance from the
country of origin provide clues about the relative attitudes towards newcomers in the host society.
Because of their ideological predisposition, countries with left-wing incumbent governments should
be more attractive to immigrants. At the same time, and more crucial for this research, we expect
individuals to be more likely to migrate to countries whose government is assessed as more left-wing
compared to the government in the origin country. This distance, in particular, allows immigrants
to form expectations about the immigrants’ role, duties and responsibilities in a new society, as
well as the relative degree of discriminatory attitudes and prejudice, compared to their country of
origin (Weldon, 2006).
Against this background, we investigate whether the relative ideological orientation of the desti-
nation country, with respect to the country of origin, shapes bilateral migration flows. We assemble
data on governments’ political ideologies and construct measures of ideological distance by convert-
ing the incumbent party’s manifesto-based data into country-year cells.4 We employ information
on 36 OECD countries between 1990 and 2016. Focusing on OECD countries has the advantage
of examining a set of rather homogeneous countries in a number of socio-economic characteristics,
which helps to isolate the role of time-varying distances in political orientations.5 We rely on
augmented gravity equations that include both long-run and short-run determinants and account
for multilateral resistance terms (Bertoli and Moraga, 2013; Beine and Parsons, 2015). By includ-
ing multilateral resistances to migration, we explicitly address endogeneity bias arising from the
omission of time-varying characteristics for both sending and receiving states (Beine et al., 2016).
We also add pair fixed effects to account for all time-invariant bilateral factors (e.g., any form of
connections between countries) affecting migration flows, and year fixed effects to capture common
shocks across countries. Issues of reverse causality are mitigated by using migration flows at the
bilateral level, which are only a fraction of the total size of the labour and the good markets (see
also Beine et al., 2019). Although population movements, in particular refugee flows, can affect
voting outcomes (Hangartner et al., 2019; Dustmann et al., 2019; Bellucci et al., 2019), the bilateral
nature of our dataset makes it less likely that these effects are driven by immigrants from single
4Using different data, Dreher et al. (2015) convincingly show that differences in political ideology between national
governments is an important factor shaping the effectiveness of aid. Yet, there are no studies on how differences in
political ideology affect cross-border immigration.
5Furthermore, OECD countries are among the top destinations of international migration, hosting more than half
of the international migrant population in 2015 (UN DESA, 2016).
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OECD countries.6 Using illustrative examples, we show that bilateral migrant flows do not predate,
but rather follow changes in the relative ideology measure.
Our empirical analysis reveals that population movements increase when the government in the
host country is more left-leaning, and relatively more left-wing than the government in the country
of origin. The estimated effect of the relationship between relative ideology and immigration is
not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful. On average, according to our
baseline model, the number of immigrants increases by about 7 per cent for a one standard deviation
increase in ideological distance. Put differently, dyads/year with the highest value of ideological
distance have, all else equal, about 70% higher migration flows than dyads/years with the lowest
value of ideological distance. En route, we explore whether and to what extent the estimated
effect depends on institutional similarities and identification across borders, as information about
political institutions, parties and ideological groups should be more easily available and less difficult
to compare between proximate societies. We demonstrate that our results are stronger when the
destination and origin countries are geographically close to each other, and when we focus on
European Union (EU) dyads, where exposure to the political landscape of member states facilitates
the identification of national parties in the heuristic left-right spectrum.
In the following section, we take stock of the existing literature on differences in parties’ positions
on migration along the ideological left–right axis of national governments. On the basis of current
research, we argue that relative ideological distance provides an important signal about the level
of tolerance towards foreign-borns, which in turn affects migration flows.
2 Theoretical Framework
Anecdotal evidence and empirical studies suggest that the quality of local amenities is a key fac-
tor that shapes migration plans. In addition to considerations about wages and employment, the
intention to move to a new country is affected by individual assessments of national amenities and
subjective considerations about differences in public services, security and the quality of governance
and institutions between sending and receiving states (see e.g., Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2013; Dust-
mann and Okatenko, 2014). Yet, less discernible aspects of the so-called “context of reception”,
the range of material and moral resources that are made available by the government and the
receiving communities to newcomers (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; White and Johnson, 2016), are
also important in the choice of migration destination but remain largely unexplored. In particular,
the social and institutional context shapes the salience of ethnic differences and the degree of social
tolerance towards foreign-borns (Weldon, 2006). In recent decades, migration flows have increased
host countries’ pressures to “articulate a coherent national identity in the face of immigrant-related
6Recent research also shows that the impact of immigration on support for far-right candidates is driven by
low-educated immigrants from non-Western countries (Edo et al., 2019). Limiting our analysis to OECD countries
only should further address this concern.
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diversity and to define avenues for inclusion for these now-permanent populations” (Goodman,
2012, p.663). This pressure can generate social tensions, and foreign residents are often confronted
with episodes of discrimination and intolerance, and negative public discourse (Hainmueller and
Hangartner, 2013; Strijbis, 2014). Particularly in recent decades, discrimination and the rise of
anti-immigrant parties have become an important issue, as evidenced, for example, by the approval
of the European Union’s Racial Equality Directive (RED) in 2000 (Givens, 2007). Even in advanced
democracies, where principles of tolerance towards out-groups and minorities are enshrined in the
constitution, newcomers often face prejudice and intolerance from native populations.7
Crucially, the politics of the receiving community can shape expectations regarding the type
of treatment immigrants will receive (Menjivar, 1997). For example, anti-immigrant political cam-
paigns and appeals for immigration restrictions are likely to deter immigrants. US president Donald
Trump’s anti-immigration rhetoric, and the introduction of a travel ban in 2017 which placed re-
strictions on travel to the US for citizens of seven countries, created an unwelcoming image of the
country also for foreign citizens not directly targeted by the ban (Reardon, 2017). This stands in
sharp contrast to the rhetoric of his predecessor: since the the beginning of his presidency, Barack
Obama argued in favour of a more comprehensive approach to immigration, including a more clear-
cut pathway to citizenship. Interestingly, partisan divisions over immigration are widening in the
wake of large population movements. For example, in a recent poll, about 78% of Republicans
claimed that large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States represent a
“critical threat” to the nation’s vital interests. In comparison, only 19% of Democrats had similar
views (Washington Post, 09/09/2019). Yet, the extent to which public sentiments are on balance
positive or negative towards immigrants, or the actual position of each government towards new-
comers is often difficult to ascertain. As such, immigrants often rely on heuristic or information
shortcuts about the political climate in the host society (Lupia, 1994; Just, 2019). Attitudes to-
wards immigration form central themes in political campaigns and national governments, interested
in retaining power, differ significantly in their discourse and positions on migration (Joppke, 2003;
Howard and Howard, 2009; Janoski, 2010; Helbling, 2014; Abou-Chadi, 2016).
In absence of first-hand experience of the receiving context, immigrants project the party iden-
tification related to the party system in the home country on the party system in the country of
destination and compare them in terms of “party families” (Strijbis, 2014). On the one side of the
political spectrum, conservative parties have more pronounced anti-immigrant positions while their
agenda often favors common cultural heritages and values (Joppke, 2003; Helbling, 2014). Conser-
vative parties are also the only parties that have gone into coalitions with radical right parties; the
latter have at times demanded profound changes in immigration policy and new measures imped-
7Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union states that the Union is founded on the “respect for human rights,
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society
in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”
(EU, 2010, p.17)
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ing naturalization of immigrants and sometimes their deportation (Givens, 2007). On the other
side of the political spectrum, left-wing politicians take into account their constituencies’ prefer-
ences by committing to protect and promote minority interests, such as combating discrimination
and xenophobia (Just, 2019). Overall, left-wing parties usually display more liberal ideology, use
more universal frames when addressing issues of immigration and are often associated with mea-
sures to open access to citizenship to new immigrants and allow membership apart from ethnic
elements (Joppke, 2003; Helbling, 2014; Abou-Chadi, 2016). Evidently, left-wing politicians also
see immigration as a field to promote their own political platforms and serve a less nationalisti-
cally minded voter clientele. In fact, the politics of integration has mainly been the domain of left
parties interested in attracting immigrant voters (Givens, 2007). Not surprising, a left-leaning bias
in immigrants’ voting behaviors does exist and immigrants in Western Europe have been shown to
vote over-proportionally for candidates on the Left, independent of their socio-economic, cultural
and demographic characteristics (Bergh and Bjørklund, 2011; Sanders et al., 2014; Strijbis, 2014).
Hence, our main argument has it that the ideology of the incumbent in the destination country,
and the relative ideological distances in political orientation between host and home governments,
provide an important signal about the level of tolerance towards out-groups and whether the host
society has more a welcoming civic culture and tolerance of foreign-borns than the home society.
En route, we also explore whether geographic proximity enhances the effect of ideological dis-
tance on population movements. Similarities in societal norms, customs, and institutions are more
likely to be observed between geographically proximate societies, and these commonalities increase
citizens’ information about the political environment of neighbouring societies (Gokmen, 2017;
Bo¨hmelt et al., 2019). A sufficient exposure to the political system of the potential destination
is particularly important as moving to another country means that the party identifications so-
cialized in the country of origin are not always applicable to the party system in the country of
destination, and immigrants need to associate parties from different countries into ideological fam-
ilies (Strijbis, 2014). We thus expect geographic distance to mitigate and reduce the impact of
partisanship on migration flows. Furthermore, and related to this argument, as the widening of
European integration has shaped national identities so that people identify themselves also as part
of a supra-national community (see e.g., Curtis, 2014), we look at the effect of political ideology
within the European Union. We expect the exposure to the political landscape of member states to
be enhanced not only by the physical proximity, but also by the existence of a supranational entity
with its own institutions. Immigrants often think in terms of “party families”, which are arguably
easier to relate and compare for proximate countries. As such, the existence of European elections
and the presence of political groups within the European Parliament should further facilitate the
identification of national parties in the heuristic left-right spectrum commonly used in the political
discourse.
There are two important considerations that distinguish our work from previous studies on
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how domestic political factors drive migration flows. First, we do not make the assumption that
government actors’ ideological preferences are always transferred into immigration regulations or
translated into other policy outputs. A number of studies have already explored whether and how
political orientation shapes the restrictiveness of immigration policies, although they do not detect
a direct translation of incumbents’ preferences into policy outputs (Lahav, 1997; De Haas and
Haberkorn, 2015; Abou-Chadi, 2016).8 Our argument is about the perceived public and political
sentiments towards newcomers and their expected well-being in the host society, after explicitly
controlling for host countries’ immigration policies. As such, we also depart from previous studies
on whether immigration policies, per se, deter migration flows (e.g. Ortega and Peri, 2013; Helbling
and Leblang, 2019). At the same time, our study differs from recent studies on the influence of
the electoral schedule on the time pattern of migration (Burmann et al., 2017; Moura˜o et al., 2018;
Revelli, 2019). According to these studies, electoral events can effect migration flows because of
political business cycles that generate favorable economic conditions and generous spending and
transfer policies before the elections. People may also wait for the elections’ result and decide to
leave if they are dissatisfied with the outcome. In addition to immigration flows, elections in the
destination countries also affect the number of first-time asylum applications, which declines under
right-wing cabinet (Burmann et al., 2017). We argue that the relative (post-electoral) distance in
government ideology between sending and receiving states in the dyad matters. In addition, and
as a matter of fact, our empirical strategy will flexibly account for, and absorb, all time-varying
country-specific unobservables and explicitly take into account the dynamics of migration flows
around changes in the government’s political colour.
3 Empirical Design
3.1 Sample and Main Variables
We obtain data on annual bilateral migration flows (by nationality) from the OECD’s International
Migration Database.9 Our sample covers 35 destination and 36 origin OECD countries over the
period 1990-2016.10 We exploit information on intra-OECD flows for three main reasons. First, the
OECD countries are among the top destinations of international migration. Second, the variables
required for our analysis are mostly available for these countries. Third, there is a certain degree
of homogeneity between these nations as senders and hosts, allowing us to focus on the ideology-
induced migration effects. The resulting dataset contains 14,260 observations, which is, however,
8The degree of liberalization of immigration policies often depends on the existence of veto points coupled with
the competitiveness of elections (Abou-Chadi, 2016). For example, a left-of-centre government may not be able to
liberalise policies when faced with a chamber with a right-of-centre majority and the power to block legislation.
9Downloadable from https://tinyurl.com/OECD-Migration.
10Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix shows the top origin country for each destination country in our sample
using a Sankey diagram.
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unbalanced across country dyads and years.11
The key explanatory variable in our analysis is the relative ideological distance between mi-
grants’ host and home countries, calculated by subtracting the value of government ideology at the
origin from the value of government ideology at the destination. To capture ideology we employ
a continuous measure of left-right ideological leaning that is derived from the incumbent party’s
manifesto at the time of election (Volkens et al., 2019). Specifically, this measure is constructed
using the frequency of positive and negative mentions of different issues, as captured by 26 content
analytical variables. For instance, more positive mentions of welfare state expansion, labour groups
and protectionism make a government more left-wing, whereas, more positive mentions of political
authority, traditional morality and economic orthodoxy make a government more right-wing. Fol-
lowing Seki and Williams (2014), we convert the manifesto-based data into country-year cells. This
process accounts for all the parties that participate in the government and the portion of the year
that a party is the incumbent. As an alternative measure of ideology, we employ a binary indicator
from DPI (2017), which takes value 1 for left governments (e.g., those defined as socialist, social
democratic, or left-wing) and 0 for right governments (e.g., those defined as conservative, Christian
democratic, or right-wing).12 While this indicator does not account for parties’ manifesto positions
(which may vary across governments with the same political colour), it comes with the advantage
that it is less subject to endogeneity bias.
In Figure 1, we present the time evolution of migration flows and our manifesto-based ideological
distance measure for four sample dyads: Australia to the UK, Portugal to Spain, Germany to
Austria and Norway to Sweden. We choose four cases of neighbouring countries or dyads with
low linguistic distance (Australia/UK) to focus on origins-destinations with comparable economic
and social conditions. These dyads are also characterized by pre-existing high levels of annual
cross-border migration and by the presence of historical “enclaves” where other people from the
same country of origin already live. As such, the only major variation is given by changing levels of
ideological distance.13 A visual inspection of this figure provides some first evidence that the two
variables are highly correlated: an increase in the ideological distance (for example, the destination
country becoming more left-wing compared to the country of origin) is associated with an increase
in migration flows towards the destination country. Although this evidence is best described as
descriptive, it is very suggestive and reveals an interesting relation. We now turn to a more
systematic analysis of the causal relationship.
[Figure 1 about here]
11The proportion of missing values reflects differences in the size and quality of data collection across countries
(see also Beine et al., 2019).
12To create this binary measure, we include the (small number of) centrist governments in the left-wing category.
The correlation coefficient between our manifesto- and DPI-based measures of ideological distance is 0.49.
13Note that we use data on migration flows by nationality. As such, the data also capture foreign-born individuals
from a variety of ethnic groups who have become nationals of e.g., Australia and then moved to the UK. We would
expect the context of reception in the destination country to play an even larger role for this segment of the population.
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3.2 Estimation Strategy
To examine the impact of ideological distance on migration flows, we embed our key independent
variable into a micro-founded gravity model of international migration. The theoretical underpin-
ning of this model is derived from the income maximization framework (Borjas, 1987; Grogger and
Hanson, 2011; Beine et al., 2011, 2019). One of the key strengths of this framework is that it
allows us to generate predictions about the main determinants of international migration that are
in line with the recent macroeconomic literature and can be readily estimated (Anderson, 2011).
In particular, following the recent work of Beine et al. (2019), we control for relative business cycles
and relative employment rates to account for the fact that economic agents form expectations of
future employment based on information provided by the current state of the economy.14 The
main difference in our approach is the expectation that (in addition to macroeconomic factors)
governments’ political ideology will also play a significant role for immigrants’ destination choices,
as it can signal the level of tolerance towards out-groups and the expected well-being of newcomers.
More formally, our model specification takes the following form:
‘Migration flows’ij,t = α‘Ideological distance’ij,t + β1X
i
t + β2X
j
t + β3Yij,t + γt + γij + εij,t (1)
where ‘Migration flows’ij,t represents the directional flows of migrants between two countries (di-
rected dyads), measured by the number of migrants flowing from a country of origin i to a desti-
nation country j at time t (in logarithm);15 ‘Ideological distance’ij,t is the distance in government
ideology between the two countries, as defined in Section 3.1; Xit and X
j
t are vectors containing
time-varying variables in the origin and destination countries; Yij,t is a vector of pair-specific vari-
ables that vary over time; γt and γij represent year and dyad fixed effects, respectively; and, εij,t
is an error term clustered at the directed dyad level. Our parameter of interest, α, measures the
effect of ideological distance on bilateral migration flows, with a positive value providing support
for the argument that population movements increase when the government at the destination is
more left-wing than the government at the origin.
Xit and X
j
t include variables measuring expectations regarding future incomes in the two coun-
tries. These are captured by the expected income conditional on being employed (the average wage
level) and the expected probability of being employed in a given country, which depends on the
current level of employment in the economy (employment rate) and its current cyclical state (real
GDP growth).16 Yij,t includes three variables capturing factors that may favour mobility of people
14By accounting for expectations about future employment probabilities, Beine et al. (2019) depart from the
traditional random utility maximization approach (McFadden, 1984), where economic agents do not face uncertainty
about future employment and only care about wage differentials and the level of migration costs.
15We add a value of 1 before taking the logarithm to avoid taking the logarithm of 0.
16As argued by Beine et al. (2019), the current level of the employment rate integrates the impact of past business
cycles and some structural effects from the labour market, whereas the current business cycle provides information
that is more forward-looking in terms of future employment rates.
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between the two countries: a dummy variable for a joint membership to the Schengen Agreement
at time t; a dummy variable for a joint membership to the EU at time t; and the size of the existing
diaspora, as captured by the bilateral stock of migrants (in logarithm).17 The inclusion of year fixed
effects in our specification controls for shocks in migration flows that are common to all countries,
whereas the inclusion of dyad fixed effects captures pull and push factors, as well as and the part
of migration costs, that are pair-specific and time-invariant, including transport costs of moving,
the psychic costs of separation from home, and the costs of information about remote locations
(Lucas, 2001). Due to the low frequency of zeros in ‘Migration flows’ (i.e., less than 3.5% of the
non-missing observations), Eq. (1) is estimated using traditional panel data techniques rather than
methods that are designed to deal with the existence of a large proportion of zeros in the dependent
variable. Nevertheless, our results persist when we employ such methods (see Section 4.4).
To explore whether our results are largely driven by geographically proximate and politically
integrated societies (as discussed in Section 2), we interact our primary explanatory variable, ‘Ideo-
logical distance’, with a variable capturing the physical distance between host and home countries,
and restrict the sample to include country-pairs that are both members of the EU at time t (EU
dyads). Evidence for the conditionality of the reported effects upon these factors can be inferred
from the coefficients on ‘Ideological distance’ and the interaction term having the opposite signs,
and the coefficients for EU dyads having a larger magnitude than those for the full sample of dyads.
Table A.1 in the Online Appendix provides a full description of all variables used in the analysis,
together with the corresponding data sources. Descriptive statistics for these variables are given in
Table A.2.
4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Main Results
Table 1 reports the results obtained from estimating Eq. (1). To examine the sensitivity of the
estimate on ‘Ideological distance’ to the inclusion of control variables, we adopt an ‘incremental
strategy’. In particular, we start from a simple specification that includes our key explanatory
variable and dyad fixed effects, and we then add year fixed effects and the control variables in a
progressive manner. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates for the ‘unrestricted sample’ (i.e.,
the sample size is not restricted by the availability of control variables), whereas columns (3)-(9)
report the estimates for the ‘baseline sample’ (i.e., the sample size is determined by the availability
of the full set of control variables). At a first point, we can see that both long-run and short-run
economic factors exert an influence on bilateral migration flows: an increase in the average wage at
17The bilateral stock of migrants captures the existing stock of migrants from country i living in country j. The
data are taken from the updated version of O¨zden et al. (2011) and are available for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005,
2010 and 2015. Thus, our measure reflects the value in the beginning year to which a flow corresponds (e.g., for the
years 2000-2004, we use the value in 2000).
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destination and a decrease in the current employment rate at the origin lead to a significant increase
in the number of migrants moving from the origin to the destination country. In line with Beine
et al. (2019), we can also see that the EU and the Schengen Agreement play a significant role for the
international mobility of workers between the members states. Turning now to our key explanatory
variable, we find strong evidence that bilateral migration flows increase when the government in the
destination country is more left-wing than the government in the origin country: the coefficient on
‘Ideological distance’ is positive and statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. Specifically,
the estimate in column (9) suggests that dyads/years with the highest value of ideological distance,
will have, on average, about 70% higher migration flows compared to dyads/years with the lowest
value of ideological distance.18 In terms of substantive average effect, the same estimate implies
that a one standard deviation increase in ideological difference will lead to a 6.8 percent increase
in migration inflow. This is a quite large effect if one considers the total number of immigrants
within the OECD.
To explore whether the results in Table 1 can be attributed to changes in the political landscape
at both the host and home countries, we replace ‘Ideological distance’ in Eq. (1) with its two
components: ideology at the destination and ideology at the origin. Columns (1) and (2) in Table
2 show the corresponding results before and after introducing the control variables. The estimated
coefficients on the two variables have the expected sign and both appear to be statistically significant
at conventional levels. However, the ideology at the origin seems to exert a weaker and statistically
less robust effect on bilateral migration flows once the control variables are added. This suggests
that, while pre-migration experiences and information about the ideology of the home country’s
government can play some role for migration decision-making (Just, 2019), the political landscape of
the possible host countries, and in particular the relative distance with that of the country of origin,
is what matters the most. To further assess the sensitivity of our results, we replace the vector of
origin-specific time-varying variables, Xit, with origin-year fixed effects. In this way, we are able
to capture all (observed and unobserved) factors at the origin that may confound the relationship
between migration flows and ideology at the destination, and account for the multilateral resistance
to migration.19 As shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, the inclusion of origin-year fixed effects
leaves the estimate on ideology at the destination unchanged. Similarly, replacing the vector of
destination-specific time-varying variables, Xjt , with destination-year fixed effects, has little effect
on the estimate on ideology at the origin (see columns (5) and (6)).
[Table 1 and Table 2 about here]
18Given that the outcome is in logged values, the percentage change effect is calculated by eλ−1, with λ being the
estimated coefficient on ideological distance (α) multiplied by the difference between the maximum and the minimum
value of ideological distance.
19Multilateral resistance to migration capture the fact that any change in bilateral migration flows will also affect
the other relationships between the two countries (Anderson, 2011; Beine et al., 2019).
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4.2 Endogeneity Issues
Potential endogeneity concerns may arise with the estimation of Eq. (1). If governments’ ideological
orientation is influenced by unobserved factors that are also relevant for migration flows, omitted
variable bias would prevent the identification of a causal effect. Similarly, if parties’ left-right
positions (or the electoral outcomes) are partly determined by past migration flows, reverse causality
may drive the relationship between the two variables.
Omitted variable bias. Two important factors are often omitted when estimating gravity
models of international migration, which may lead to biased estimates (Beine et al., 2016, 2019).
These factors are migrant networks (i.e., diasporas at the destination which can drive further mi-
gration inward due to lower migration costs) and unilateral immigration policies (i.e., immigration
policies that are implemented with respect to all partner countries, and can be correlated with the
political colour of the government). In Eq. (1), we account for the effect of migrant networks by
controlling for the size of the bilateral migration stock at the start of a migration period (based on
5-year migration periods). In the Online Appendix, we also show that our results persist when we
consider (lagged) bilateral migration stocks with annual frequency (available for a subset of obser-
vations) and when we estimate a dynamic panel data model. Similarly, in the Online Appendix,
we show that the inferences on our ideological distance measure do not change when we control for
unilateral immigration policies, based on a newly-released dataset by Helbling et al. (2017). More
importantly, the results presented in the previous section are quite reassuring as regards to biases
arising from the potential omission of unobserved characteristics. First, our ideological distance
estimates in Table 1 do not seem to be sensitive to the inclusion of control variables, suggesting that
the impact of unobservables must be relatively large, compared to observables, to invalidate our
findings.20 Second, as illustrated in Table 2, our results are robust to controlling for multilateral
resistance to migration through the inclusion of origin-year or destination-year fixed effects, which
can arguably capture a big part of omitted factors (Beine and Parsons, 2015; Beine et al., 2019).
Reverse causality. Another concern is whether there is a reverse causal relationship from
international migration to the ideological positions of parties (and thus of elected governments),
especially when it comes to the destination countries. An important reason why this concern is
less acute in our context is that we rely on bilateral migration flows. As stressed by Beine et al.
(2019), the bilateral nature of this type of analysis makes concerns about reverse causality much
less serious than in a unilateral analysis of migration, since migration flows at the bilateral level
are quite modest relative to the total size of migration flows at the destination. However, to
ensure that reverse causality in not a major problem in our analysis, we adopt two complementary
20To assess the extent to which unobservables may drive our results, we follow Altonji et al. (2005) in calculating
how strong selection on unobservables would have to be in order to explain the observed relationship between migration
flows and ideological distance. By comparing the estimates in columns (3) and (9) of Table 1, we find that the impact
of unobserved factors would have to be at least 4.6 times stronger, as compared to observed factors, in order to
explain away the effect of ideological distance. This makes it unlikely that unobservable factors will play a major role
in our results.
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approaches. First, we consider an alternative measure of ideological distance, which is constructed
using information from the DPI (2017). As opposed to our continuous manifesto-based measure of
political orientation, the DPI measure is dichotomous (parties are classified into right-wing and left-
wing) and thus it is less prone to endogeneity; e.g., when parties adjust their positions in response
to changing patterns of migration or public opinion trends. Second, we look at the dynamics of
migration flows around the period of a left-wing government at the destination; that is, two years
before the start and two years after the end of a left administration. Significant pre-left and post-
left effects would potentially cast doubt on our interpretation that bilateral migration flows increase
only when a left party is in office. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 3 present the results when ideological
distance and ideology at the destination are based on the DPI measure. The evidence obtained is in
line with our previous findings.21 Column (5) reports the results when we augment the specification
of column (4) with the pre-left and post-left variables. The pre-left variable enters the specification
with a negative sign and fails to reach statistical significance, suggesting that our findings cannot
be explained by patterns of migration in the years preceding a left administration. Even though
the estimate on the post-left variable turns out be statistically significant, its magnitude is much
smaller than that on ideology, which may well reflect slowly changing migration patterns in the
first years of a right administration.
To shed further light on the timing of the effects, we replace our ideology (at the destination)
variable with six time indicators capturing years 1 and 2, years 3 and 4, and years 4+ before and
after the change to a left government. Figure 2 depicts the estimates on these indicators. Taking
the year of government change (at the destination) as the baseline, the figure shows that bilateral
migration flows increase only after the government change and persist throughout the term of a left
administration. This is consistent with Burmann et al. (2017), who show that only after an election,
the inflow of refugees differs between right-wing and left-wing cabinets. In addition, the absence
of significant effects in all the years of a right-wing administration indicates, once again, that the
change in the political colour of the government is not associated with pre-electoral fluctuations in
migration flows.
[Table 3 and Figure 2 about here]
4.3 Geographic Distance and EU Membership
The results displayed in Table 1 are not necessarily uniform across the country dyads covered in our
analysis. As discussed in Section 2, the ideology-induced migration effects may be more prevalent
for countries that are geographically close to one another, and those that are members of the EU.
To investigate the empirical validity of this argument, we first add to the specification with the
manifesto-based ideological distance its interaction with geographic distance and then restrict the
21While the manifesto-based measure is available for the period 1990-2014, the DPI measure covers the years 2015
and 2016 too. Running regressions based on the common sample does not change our results.
13
sample to include the EU dyads only.22 Table 4 presents the results before and after the inclusion
of the full set of control variables. Two regularities stand out. First, the extent to which ideological
distance affects bilateral migration flows is highly conditional upon the physical proximity between
migrants’ host and home countries. Specifically, at low values of geographic distance, the ideological
differences between the governments of the two countries play a significant role for migration flows,
whereas, at high values of geographic distance, these effects are dampened or vanish – as inferred
from the positive and significantly estimated coefficients of ideological distance, together with the
negative and significantly estimated coefficients of the interaction terms with geographic distance
(see columns (1) and (2)). Second, when we look at the EU dyads, the corroborating evidence is
economically much stronger, suggesting that both physical distance and EU membership can serve
as channels through which prospective migrants receive information about the political environment
of other countries (see columns (3) and (4)).
To explore more thoroughly the conditionality of the ideology effects upon physical proximity,
we calculate the marginal effects of ideological distance (based on estimates from the regressions
in columns (2) and (4) of Table 4) and plot them over the respective values of geographic distance.
As shown in panel (a) of Figure 3, the observed relationship for the full sample of dyads is partially
driven by countries that are geographically close to one another. Furthermore, as shown in panel
(b) of Figure 3, when we focus on the EU dyads, the effect of ideological distance becomes far more
pronounced, and the result is still conditional upon geographic distance. All in all, our analysis
in this section confirms that exposure to the political landscape of other countries facilitates the
identification of national parties in the heuristic left-right spectrum, and, as such, can determine
the extent to which ideological differences matter for migration decisions.
[Table 4 and Figure 3 about here]
4.4 Robustness Tests and Further Insights
The key finding that emerges from our analysis is that bilateral migration flows are higher when
the government at the destination is more left-wing than the government at the origin. To provide
further support for this finding, we perform a series of robustness tests, which are reported in the
Online Appendix.
In Table A.3, we check the sensitivity of our results to augmenting the baseline specification with
a number of regressors, which can serve as additional (potential) determinants of bilateral migration
flows. Specifically, we add the following variables at both the destination and the origin: the
22Geographic distance does not only capture the presence of geographical barriers and transportation costs, but it
also plays a major role in explaining genetic distance (Giuliano et al., 2014), which has long been used as a proxy for
the array of cultural traits transmitted intergenerationally within populations over the long run (Bove and Gokmen,
2018). As such, it also allows us to account for some of the differences in social norms, customs and habits. Moreover,
compared to time-varying measures of cultural distance, such as those derived from the World Value Survey, it has
the advantage of predating bilateral migration flows and is available for all dyads.
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restrictiveness of unilateral immigration policies (Helbling et al., 2017),23 the size of the country (as
captured by the logarithm of the country’s total population), the expectations about the evolution
of economic conditions (as captured by the yields on 10-year government bonds), the number of
researchers (as a proxy for high-skilled labour), the quality of political institutions (as measured
by the Polity score), the degree of economic integration with the rest of the world (as captured by
the KOF index of economic globalization; Gygli et al. (2019)), and the number of terrorist attacks
against refugees (as a proxy for political violence).24 The effect of ideological distance remains
positive, statistically significant, and stable in size across these specifications.25
In Table A.4, we carry out additional checks to make sure that the migrant network effect
does not distort our results. First, we replace the bilateral migration stock variable from O¨zden
et al. (2011) (measured based on 5-year migration periods) with the corresponding variable from the
OECD Immigration Database (with annual frequency but available for a subset of our observations).
Second, we estimate a dynamic panel data model that includes the lagged dependent variable among
the controls, which allows us to capture persistence in migration flows and also potentially mean-
reverting dynamics. Third, we exclude the pairs of countries for which there is a relatively large
network. More precisely, we follow Beine et al. (2019) and drop from our sample the country pairs
with the 1% and 5% highest values of migrant networks in the last available migration period, and
those with the 1% and 5% highest growth in migrant networks over the full investigated period
(using the O¨zden et al. (2011)’s bilateral stock data). The results obtained from these tests are
very similar to those presented in Table 1.26
In Table A.5, we assess how the presence of zero values in the dependent variable affects our
results. To do so, we estimate our baseline model using ‘unscaled’ OLS, where the dependent
variable is measured by the logarithm of bilateral migration flows before adding the value 1. As a
further approach, we employ the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator developed
by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The latter allows us to include the zero values for the dependent
variable, and rule out potential selection bias arising from country pairs with zero flows having a
different population distribution compared to those with positive flows (Beine and Parsons, 2015).
The PPML has also been shown to perform better in the presence of heteroscedasticity as compared
to OLS and Tobit and is resilient to measurement errors (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The results of
these alternative estimations do not change the inferences drawn from earlier findings. Once again,
23Helbling et al. (2017) define immigration policy as the government’s statements of what it intends to do or not
do (including laws, regulations, decisions or orders) in regards to the selection, admission, settlement and deportation
of foreign citizens residing in the country.
24To account for the fact that social benefits tend to be higher during left-wing administrations (Bove et al., 2017),
we also experiment by controlling for the total value of social expenditure (as a % of GDP) at both the destination
and origin. Our results, once again, do not change.
25While the estimate on ideological distance in the specification with immigration policies appears to be econom-
ically less significant, this is exclusively driven by the smaller sample size: excluding the variable for immigration
policies but keeping the same sample size returns the same estimate.
26Our results are also robust to dropping each country in our sample (as destination or origin) one by one. These
tests are not reported but are available upon request.
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we can observe a positive impact of ideological distance on bilateral migration flows.
We also check robustness to two alternative model specifications. To further address endogeneity
concerns, we replace the (manifesto-based) ideological distance variable with its one-year and two-
year lags. As shown in Table A.6, the lagged variable returns statistically significant estimates,
which (as expected) are relatively smaller than that on the contemporaneous measure. On the other
hand, to further address the possibility of measurement errors in the way we capture government
ideology, we employ a third ideological distance variable based on information from the updated
version of Potrafke (2009).27 Using this variable and running the same regression set-up as before
does not change our results (see Table A.7).
Finally, to gain additional insights into the relationship between ideological distance and mi-
gration flows, we explore one of the main underlying mechanisms: social tolerance; i.e., “the right
to express cultural difference and the acceptance of this by the native population” (Weldon, 2006,
p.335). In particular, since citizens’ tolerance for ethnic minorities or appreciation for foreign cul-
tures is strongly related to the degree to which the dominant ethnic tradition is institutionalized
(Weldon, 2006), our results can partly be driven by governments’ positions on traditional or religious
moral values. To this end, we replace our ideological distance measure with one of its ‘right-wing’
components; namely, the difference in the frequency of positive mentions of ‘traditional morality’
between destination and origin countries.28 The results, presented in Table A.8, provide evidence
in favour of the above argument: bilateral migration flows decrease when the government at the
destination is associated with higher values of traditional morality, compared to the government at
the origin.
5 Conclusions
Whereas existing studies have introduced a wide range of factors that drive migration flows, they
mostly focus on economic considerations, and we still lack a systematic analysis of whether and
how the political landscape of the host society vis-a-vis that of the home country affect the flow
of transnational population movements. We complement these studies by introducing a broader
perspective that captures the sensitivity of immigrants to the ideological distance between the
governments of the two countries. As national states seek to develop adequate policies to address the
challenges and opportunities of immigration, political parties and governments differ widely in their
approach towards ethnic diversity and their tolerance of foreign-borns. Government institutions
27The Potrafke index takes the following values: 1 if the share of governing right-wing parties is larger than 2/3;
2 if it is between 1/3 and 2/3; and, 3 if the share of centrist parties is 50% or if the left-wing and right-wing parties
form a coalition government that is not dominated by one side or the other. The index is symmetric and takes the
values 4 and 5 if left-wing parties dominate. Data for this index are not available for the ‘new’ members of the EU,
and thus we can only perform this test for a subset of our observations.
28Positive mentions of traditional morality include support for the role of religious institutions in state and society,
and maintenance and stability of the traditional family as a value.
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and political orientations can shape the degree of social tolerance and judgments towards foreign-
borns. As such, differences in government partisanship can be an important signal regarding a
receiving society’s attitude towards immigrants beyond the actual immigration laws in place. In
absence of a first-hand experience of the social and political context in the receiving states, we argue
that immigrants use the difference in political orientation between host and home countries to infer
the relative level of tolerance towards out-groups and whether host societies have a welcoming civic
culture towards non-native populations.
Using data on 36 OECD countries between 1990 and 2016, and augmented gravity equations,
we show that migration patterns are sensitive to the political distance between sending and desti-
nation countries, once we control for several important economic and demographic considerations.
In particular, our results reveal that bilateral migration flows are higher when the government at
the destination is more left-wing than the government at the origin. As geographic proximity and
the membership to a supranational institution should facilitate immigrants’ exposure to important
information about the political landscape of destination countries, we also show that the ideology-
induced effect is larger when the two countries are geographically close to each other, and when
they are both members of the EU. Taken together, our findings shed new light on the determinants
of migration flows and highlight how governments’ manifesto and their rhetoric around issues of tol-
erance and preferences for immigration can contribute to shaping the composition of contemporary
societies, even in absence of actual changes in states’ immigration policies.
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Figure 1: Case Study Evidence
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Notes: This graph shows the time evolution of bilateral migration flows and ideological distance for four sample
dyads.
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Figure 2: The Timing of Effects for Destination Countries
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Figure 3: Conditional Effects
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Notes: This graph shows the conditional effects of ideological distance at different values of geographic distance
based on the full sample of dyads (panel (a)) and the sub-sample of EU dyads (panel (b)). The conditional effects
are calculated based on the specifications of columns (2) and (4) in Table 4. All other covariates are held constant
at their means. Dashed lines signify 90% confidence intervals. Rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates the distribution
of geographic distance in KMs. Red horizontal line marks marginal effect of 0.
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Table 1: Migration Flows and Ideological Distance: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ideological distance 0.362*** 0.293*** 0.390*** 0.380*** 0.348*** 0.347*** 0.338*** 0.332*** 0.320***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Real GDP growth [dest.] -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.528) (0.424) (0.541) (0.669) (0.778) (0.695)
Real GDP growth [origin] -0.011** -0.007* -0.008* -0.007 -0.004 -0.004
(0.011) (0.095) (0.057) (0.101) (0.378) (0.295)
Employment rate [dest.] 0.005 -0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006
(0.442) (0.984) (0.653) (0.419) (0.366)
Employment rate [origin] -0.021*** -0.019** -0.021** -0.024*** -0.023***
(0.009) (0.020) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005)
Average wage [dest.] 1.230*** 1.203*** 1.167*** 1.217***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average wage [origin] -0.243 -0.417 -0.459* -0.544**
(0.361) (0.116) (0.081) (0.035)
EU members 0.361*** 0.307*** 0.266***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.008)
Schengen members 0.134** 0.110*
(0.025) (0.070)
Dyadic stock 0.166***
(0.003)
Year FEs
Dyad FEs
R-squared 0.895 0.908 0.911 0.911 0.912 0.912 0.913 0.913 0.913
No. of dyads 925 925 821 821 821 821 821 821 821
Observations 14,260 14,260 9,262 9,262 9,262 9,262 9,262 9,262 9,262
Notes: Columns report p-values. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the ‘unrestricted sample’ (i.e., the sample size is not restricted
by the availability of control variables). Standard errors are clustered at the dyad level. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% confidence level respectively.
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Table 2: Migration Flows and Ideology at Destination and Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ideology [dest.] 0.486*** 0.473*** 0.488*** 0.477***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ideology [orig.] -0.295*** -0.163* -0.298*** -0.160**
(0.003) (0.074) (0.000) (0.036)
Real GDP growth [dest.] 0.002 0.000
(0.756) (0.928)
Real GDP growth [origin] -0.005 -0.004
(0.275) (0.145)
Employment rate [dest.] -0.007 -0.004
(0.318) (0.537)
Employment rate [origin] -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.003) (0.000)
Average wage [dest.] 1.217*** 1.139***
(0.000) (0.000)
Average wage [origin] -0.553** -0.618***
(0.033) (0.003)
EU members 0.272*** -0.011 0.397***
(0.007) (0.915) (0.000)
Schengen members 0.114* 0.107 0.104*
(0.059) (0.171) (0.064)
Dyadic stock 0.165*** 0.136** 0.186***
(0.004) (0.014) (0.001)
Origin x Year FEs
Dest. x Year FEs
Year FEs
Dyad FEs
R-squared 0.911 0.913 0.918 0.919 0.954 0.956
No. of dyads 821 821 821 821 821 821
Observations 9,262 9,262 9,262 9,262 9,262 9,262
Notes: Columns report p-values. Standard errors are clustered at the dyad level. ***,**,* Statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
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Table 3: Migration Flows and Ideological Distance: Binary Ideology Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ideological distance (DPI) 0.154*** 0.152***
(0.000) (0.000)
Ideology (DPI) [dest.] 0.243*** 0.253*** 0.280***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-left (2 years) [dest.] -0.023
(0.259)
Post-left (2 years) [dest.] 0.121***
(0.000)
Real GDP growth [dest.] 0.010** 0.009* 0.011**
(0.044) (0.082) (0.027)
Real GDP growth [origin] 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.757) (0.658) (0.662)
Employment rate [dest.] -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.801) (0.754) (0.941)
Employment rate [origin] -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Average wage [dest.] 0.271 0.257 0.163
(0.303) (0.323) (0.522)
Average wage [origin] -0.930*** -0.919*** -0.912***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EU members 0.282*** 0.302*** 0.300***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Schengen members 0.241*** 0.263*** 0.269***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Dyadic stock 0.122** 0.127** 0.119**
(0.026) (0.017) (0.026)
Year FEs
Dyad FEs
R-squared 0.904 0.906 0.904 0.907 0.907
No. of dyads 832 832 832 832 832
Observations 9,809 9,809 9,809 9,809 9,809
Notes: Pre-left captures the two years before the start of a left administration, whereas
post-left captured the two years after the end of a left administration. Columns report p-
values. Standard errors are clustered at the dyad level. ***,**,* Statistically significant at
the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
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Table 4: Migration Flows and Ideological Distance:
Interactions with Geographic Distance and EU Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ideological distance 0.320*** 0.648*** 0.793*** 1.518**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.014)
Ideological distance x Geographic distance -0.039*** -0.580
(0.000) (0.151)
Real GDP growth [dest.] 0.002 0.002 -0.014* -0.014*
(0.695) (0.756) (0.092) (0.091)
Real GDP growth [origin] -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007
(0.295) (0.308) (0.283) (0.277)
Employment rate [dest.] -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007
(0.366) (0.466) (0.500) (0.558)
Employment rate [origin] -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.025** -0.029**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.047) (0.020)
Average wage [dest.] 1.217*** 1.199*** 1.075* 1.050*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.088) (0.093)
Average wage [origin] -0.544** -0.503* -1.141** -1.176***
(0.035) (0.051) (0.010) (0.008)
EU members 0.266*** 0.257**
(0.008) (0.011)
Schengen members 0.110* 0.100 -0.016 -0.013
(0.070) (0.101) (0.857) (0.887)
Dyadic stock 0.166*** 0.159*** -0.103 -0.101
(0.003) (0.005) (0.123) (0.121)
Sample Full Full EU dyads EU dyads
Year FEs
Dyad FEs
R-squared 0.913 0.914 0.888 0.889
No. of dyads 821 821 383 383
Observations 9,262 9,262 4,005 4,005
Notes: Columns report p-values. Standard errors are clustered at the dyad level. ***,**,* Sta-
tistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
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APPENDIX
For Online Publication
• Figure A.1 is a Sankey diagram that depicts the top origin country for each of the 35
destination countries.
• Table A.1 sets out detailed definitions and sources for each variable used in the analysis.
• Table A.2 provides summary statistics for each variable used in the analysis.
• Table A.3 shows robustness to controlling for additional (potential) determinants of
bilateral migration flows. We include the following measures at both the origin and des-
tination: immigration policies; total population; long-term interest rates; the number
of researchers per 1,000 people; the polity score; the degree of economic globalisation;
and the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated against refugees.
• Table A.4 shows robustness to accounting for the impact of migrant networks. First,
we use the OECD annual data on dyadic migration stock, lagged by 1 year. Second,
we estimate a dynamic panel data model that includes the lagged dependent variable.
Third, we exclude dyads based on: (i) the growth of the diaspora in the destination
country, and (ii) the size of the diaspora in the destination country.
• Table A.5 shows robustness to estimating our baseline model using two alternative
methods: ‘unscaled’ OLS and PPML.
• Table A.6 shows persistence in our estimated effects when we employ the 1-year and
2-year lagged value of ideological distance.
• Table A.7 shows robustness to using a third measure of government ideology (Potrafke,
2009) to construct our relative ideological distance variable.
• Table A.8 illustrates that our results can partly be explained by differences in the
frequency of positive mentions of ‘traditional morality’ between destination and ori-
gin countries. Specifically, we show that bilateral migration flows decrease when the
government at the destination is associated with higher values of traditional morality,
compared to the government at the origin.
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Figure A.1: Bilateral Migration Flows
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Destination Origin
Notes: This graph shows the top origin country for each destination country in our sample using a Sankey diagram.
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variable Name Definition Source
Dependent Variable
Migration flows 1 plus the natural logarithm of the flow of migrants from the origin country to the destination country. OECD Immigration Database
Ideology-Related Variables
Ideology [dest./origin] A continuous measure of left-right ideological leaning that is derived from the incumbent party’s manifesto
at the time of election. It is constructed using the frequency of positive and negative mentions of different
issues, as captured by 26 content analytical variables.
Volkens et al. (2019) & Seki and
Williams (2014)
Ideological distance Ideology [dest.] minus Ideology [origin]. Authors’ calculation from Volkens
et al. (2019) & Seki and Williams
(2014)
Ideological distance (DPI) [dest./origin] A binary indicator of ideological orientation, taking value 1 for left or centrist governments and 0 for right
governments.
DPI
Ideological distance (DPI) Ideology (DPI) [dest.] minus Ideology (DPI) [origin]. Authors’ calculation from the DPI
Ideological distance (Potrafke) The Potrafke index [dest.] minus the Potrafke index [origin]. This index places the government on a
left-right scale with values between 1 and 5. The Potrafke index takes value 1 if the share of governing
right-wing parties is larger than 2/3; 2 if it is between 1/3 and 2/3; and, 3 if the share of centrist parties
is 50% or if the left-wing and right-wing parties form a coalition government that is not dominated by one
side or the other. The index is symmetric and takes the values 4 and 5 if left-wing parties dominate.
Potrafke (2009)
Traditional morality distance Traditional morality [dest.] minus traditional morality [origin]. Traditional morality captures the frequency
of favourable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values.
Authors’ calculation from Volkens
et al. (2019) & Seki and Williams
(2014)
Other Variables
Real GDP Growth [dest./origin] Annual growth rate of real GDP. OECD
Employment rate [dest./origin] The ratio of the employed to the working age population. OECD
Average wage [dest./origin] The natural logarithm of the average wage. This is obtained by dividing the national-accounts-based total
wage bill by the average number of employees in the total economy, which is then multiplied by the ratio of
the average usual weekly hours per full-time employee to the average usually weekly hours for all employees.
OECD
EU members =1 if both destination and origin countries are members of the EU, 0 otherwise. Authors’ calculation
Schengen member =1 if both destination and origin countries are members of the EU Schengen area, 0 otherwise. Authors’ calculation
Dyadic stock 1 plus the natural logarithm of the existing stock of migrants from the origin country that reside in the
destination country, measured at the start of a migration period (based on 5-year migration periods).
O¨zden et al. (2011)
Lagged dyadic stock (OECD) The lagged value of the natural logarithm of the existing stock of migrants from the origin country that
reside in the destination country (annual frequency).
OECD Immigration Database
Geographic distance Kilometer distance (in thousands) between destination and origin countries’ most populated cities. CEPII
Immigration policies [dest./origin] The arithmetic mean of five policy field scores that govern immigration. Higher values indicate more
restrictive immigration policies.
Helbling et al. (2017)
Total population [dest./origin] The natural logarithm of the country’s total population (in thousands). OECD
Long-term interest rates [dest./origin] The yields on 10-year government bonds. OECD
Researchers [dest./origin] Professionals engaged in the conception or creation of new knowledge, products, processes, methods and
systems, as well as in the management of the projects concerned, per 1,000 people employed.
OECD
Policy score [dest./origin] The country’s level of democracy, taking values between -10 and 10. Higher values indicate a higher quality
of political institutions.
Polity IV
Economic globalisation [dest./origin] The degree of economic integration with the rest of the world, capturing both trade flows and financial flows.
It takes values between 1 and 100, with higher values indicating a higher degree of economic globalization.
Gygli et al. (2019)
Terrorist attacks against refugees [dest./origin] The number of terrorist attacks where at least one of the targets/victims is a refugee. Gineste and Savun (2019)
Notes: [dest./origin] indicates that the variable is available for both the destination country and the origin country. OECD = OECD Statistics. DPI = The World Bank’s Database of Political
Institutions. CEPII = Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Migration flows 5.489 2.209 0 12.166 9,262
Ideological distance -0.002 0.213 -0.839 0.839 9,262
Ideology [dest.] 0.010 0.154 -0.485 0.464 9,262
Ideology [origin] 0.012 0.147 -0.485 0.464 9,262
Real GDP growth [dest.] 1.945 2.982 -14.724 11.889 9,262
Real GDP growth [origin] 1.931 3.388 -14.814 11.889 9,262
Employment rate [dest.] 67.936 7.122 51.200 85.150 9,262
Employment rate [origin] 67.051 6.900 48.800 85.150 9,262
Average wage [dest.] 10.574 0.343 9.609 11.071 9,262
Average wage [origin] 10.514 0.370 9.306 11.071 9,262
EU members 0.432 0.495 0 1 9,262
Schengen members 0.441 0.497 0 1 9,262
Dyadic stock 8.233 2.316 0 14.261 9,262
Ideological distance (DPI) 0.011 0.714 -1 1 9,809
Ideology (DPI) [dest.] 0.506 0.500 0 1 9,809
Ideological distance (Potrafke) -0.016 1.212 -2 3 6,432
Traditional morality distance 0.000 1 -8.393 8.289 9,262
Geographic distance (KMs, thousands) 4.399 5.355 0.060 19.586 9,262
Lagged dyadic stock (OECD) 7.804 2.326 0.000 13.477 6,358
Immigration policies [dest.] 0.398 0.055 0.290 0.704 5,759
Immigration policies [origin] 0.411 0.072 0.294 0.704 5,759
Total population [dest.] 9.406 1.559 5.667 12.673 8,713
Total population [origin] 9.450 1.523 5.667 12.673 8,713
Long-term interest rates [dest.] 4.261 1.821 0.520 12.358 8,502
Long-term interest rates [origin] 4.391 2.205 0.520 22.498 8,502
Researchers [dest.] 7.907 3.019 2.509 17.275 7,151
Researchers [origin] 7.703 2.867 2.762 17.275 7,151
Polity score [dest.] 9.796 0.560 6 10 8,692
Polity score [origin] 9.784 0.588 6 10 8,692
Economic globalisation [dest.] 75.594 8.518 43.606 93.589 9,262
Economic globalisation [origin] 75.122 8.649 43.606 93.589 9,262
Terrorist attacks against refugees [dest.] 0.006 0.075 0 1 9,238
Terrorist attacks against refugees [origin] 0.008 0.087 0 1 9,238
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Table A.3: Robustness Tests: Additional Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ideological distance 0.320*** 0.154** 0.282*** 0.310*** 0.360*** 0.334*** 0.316*** 0.324***
(0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Real GDP growth [dest.] 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.014** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.695) (0.450) (0.901) (0.011) (0.726) (0.734) (0.728) (0.642)
Real GDP growth [origin] -0.004 0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008* -0.004
(0.295) (0.695) (0.218) (0.977) (0.370) (0.235) (0.065) (0.359)
Employment rate [dest.] -0.006 0.007 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008
(0.366) (0.422) (0.557) (0.908) (0.792) (0.398) (0.466) (0.281)
Employment rate [origin] -0.023*** -0.012 -0.026*** -0.020** -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.005) (0.188) (0.002) (0.024) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003)
Average wage [dest.] 1.217*** 1.201*** 1.241*** 1.004*** 1.164*** 1.205*** 1.243*** 1.207***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Average wage [origin] -0.544** -0.379 -0.523** -0.727** -0.602** -0.646** -0.643** -0.541**
(0.035) (0.208) (0.047) (0.013) (0.041) (0.024) (0.015) (0.037)
EU members 0.266*** 0.072 0.226** 0.154 0.278** 0.308*** 0.253*** 0.266***
(0.008) (0.511) (0.025) (0.157) (0.015) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008)
Schengen members 0.110* 0.060 0.098 0.143** 0.125* 0.094 0.087 0.118*
(0.070) (0.394) (0.113) (0.020) (0.096) (0.130) (0.145) (0.056)
Dyadic stock 0.166*** 0.341*** 0.164*** 0.139** 0.144** 0.148*** 0.151*** 0.166***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)
Immigration policies [dest.] -0.769
(0.144)
Immigration policies [origin] -1.323***
(0.004)
Total population [dest.] 0.188
(0.784)
Total population [origin] -1.244*
(0.061)
Long-term interest rates [dest.] 0.018
(0.108)
Long-term interest rates [origin] 0.017**
(0.031)
Researchers [dest.] 0.089***
(0.000)
Researchers [origin] 0.011
(0.632)
Polity score [dest.] -0.034
(0.448)
Polity score [origin] 0.075
(0.302)
Economic globalisation [dest.] -0.006
(0.278)
Economic globalisation [origin] 0.017***
(0.003)
Terrorist attacks against refugees [dest.] 0.073
(0.157)
Terrorist attacks against refugees [origin] 0.069
(0.595)
Year FEs
Dyad FEs
R-squared 0.913 0.957 0.919 0.910 0.907 0.909 0.913 0.913
No. of dyads 821 695 796 767 758 768 821 821
Observations 9,262 5,759 8,713 8,502 7,151 8,692 9,262 9,238
Notes: Columns report p-values. Standard errors are clustered at the dyad level. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence
level respectively.
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Table A.5: Robustness Tests: Alternative Estimation Methods
‘Unscaled’ OLS PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ideological distance 0.218*** 0.139*** 0.071*** 0.057***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Real GDP growth [dest.] 0.012** -0.000
(0.017) (0.704)
Real GDP growth [origin] -0.005 -0.001
(0.160) (0.124)
Employment rate [dest.] -0.003 -0.001
(0.691) (0.647)
Employment rate [origin] -0.024*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.002)
Average wage [dest.] 0.733** 0.296***
(0.013) (0.000)
Average wage [origin] -0.523** -0.093*
(0.018) (0.060)
EU members 0.234*** 0.061***
(0.008) (0.002)
Schengen members 0.215*** 0.025**
(0.000) (0.025)
Dyadic stock 0.169*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.002)
Year FEs
Dyad FEs
R-squared 0.945 0.948
No. of dyads 817 817 808 808
Observations 8,950 8,950 9,224 9,224
Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2): log(Migration Flows). De-
pendent variable in columns (3) and (4): log(1 + Migration Flows). PPML =
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. Columns report p-values. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the dyad level. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%,
5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
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Table A.6: Robustness Tests: Lagged Ideological Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ideological distance [1 year lag] 0.364*** 0.293***
(0.000) (0.000)
Ideological distance [2 year lag] 0.188*** 0.132**
(0.002) (0.026)
Real GDP growth [dest.] 0.003 0.002
(0.618) (0.770)
Real GDP growth [origin] -0.005 -0.005
(0.211) (0.213)
Employment rate [dest.] -0.007 -0.007
(0.357) (0.335)
Employment rate [origin] -0.024*** -0.026***
(0.004) (0.002)
Average wage [dest.] 1.071*** 1.192***
(0.001) (0.000)
Average wage [origin] -0.527** -0.571**
(0.043) (0.030)
EU members 0.274*** 0.260**
(0.007) (0.011)
Schengen members 0.110* 0.120**
(0.069) (0.048)
Dyadic stock 0.174*** 0.179***
(0.002) (0.002)
Year FEs
Dyad FEs
R-squared 0.912 0.914 0.911 0.914
No. of dyads 821 821 821 821
Observations 9,177 9,177 9,130 9,130
Notes: Columns report p-values. Standard errors are clustered at the dyad level.
***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
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Table A.7: Robustness Tests:
Using the Potrafke Index
(1) (2)
Ideological distance [Potrafke] 0.069*** 0.079***
(0.002) (0.000)
Real GDP growth [dest.] -0.011
(0.122)
Real GDP growth [origin] 0.002
(0.784)
Employment rate [dest.] 0.024***
(0.001)
Employment rate [origin] -0.039***
(0.001)
Average wage [dest.] 1.852***
(0.000)
Average wage [origin] -1.955***
(0.000)
Schengen members -0.095*
(0.098)
Dyadic stock -0.113
(0.363)
Year FEs
Dyad FEs
R-squared 0.898 0.903
No. of dyads 438 438
Observations 6,432 6,432
Notes: Columns report p-values. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the dyad level. ***,**,* Statistically significant at
the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
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Table A.8: Further Insights:
Migration Flows and Traditional Morality
(1) (2)
Traditional morality distance -0.054*** -0.047***
(0.000) (0.001)
Real GDP growth [dest.] 0.003
(0.516)
Real GDP growth [origin] -0.005
(0.228)
Employment rate [dest.] -0.004
(0.532)
Employment rate [origin] -0.028***
(0.001)
Average wage [dest.] 1.159***
(0.000)
Average wage [origin] -0.513**
(0.048)
EU members 0.271***
(0.008)
Schengen members 0.115*
(0.057)
Dyadic stock 0.170***
(0.003)
Year FEs
Dyad FEs
R-squared 0.911 0.913
No. of dyads 821 821
Observations 9,262 9,262
Notes: Columns report p-values. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the dyad level. ***,**,* Statistically significant at
the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
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